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DURSIE v. AMERICAN UNION INS. CO.: INSURABLE
INTEREST IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS
The Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas held in Dursie
v. American Union Ins. Co.' that a condemnee retains an insurable
interest in land condemned by eminent domain as long as he holds
title to the land. The court did not consider the filing of a security
bond by the condemnor to be a substitute for payment of just
compensation, and concluded that because the condemnee had not
been justly paid for her land, she retained title and hence an insurable interest. Appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court resulted in a three-to-three split among the judges.
The lower court
2
decision therefore stands as the law of the case.
This Note will examine the problem of defining insurable interest in eminent domain proceedings. Dursie and the leading case
of Heidisch v. Globe & Republic Ins. Co.3 serve as a conduit for discussion of the problems likely to arise in Pennsylvania under the
1964 Eminent Domain Code. 4 The Code provides for title to condemned land to pass upon the filing of the declaration of taking.
The pre-Code cases of Heidisch and Dursie, however, permit an insurable interest to remain in the condemnee as long as he retains
title. Unless the courts can find a substitute for title as the test,
condemnees will lose their insurable interest the day the declaration of taking is filed.
In Dursie, the Redevelopment Authority of Allegheny County,
by resolutions approved March 12, 1959 and October 29, 1959, condemned plaintiff's property. On December 23, 1959 the Allegheny
County Court approved the authority's bonds and petition for immediate possession. Plaintiff owned fire insurance policies issued
by defendant insurance company and made claim thereon when
her dwellings were destroyed by fire on April 19, 1960. On August
8, 1961 county viewers awarded plaintiff $10,175 for the taking of
her property. She then assigned her rights under the policies to
the authority and they brought a joint action to recover from the
insurance company.
1. 207 Pa. Super. 240, 218 A.2d 87 (1966).
2. Interview with 'Burton Laub; Dean, Dickinson School of Law;

former common pleas judge, Erie County; author, PENNSYLVANIA KEYSTONE,
and PENNSYLVANIA TRIAL GUIDE; in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, Sept. 20, 1966.

3. 368 Pa. 602, 84 A.2d 566 (1951). Both the Heidisch and Dursie
cases were decided under statutes providing for title to pass to the condemnor on the day the condemnee was paid for his property. Both courts
found that since the condemnee retained title to the property, he retained an
insurable interest therein. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 537 (1929); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 5627 (1953).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-101 (Supp. 1965).
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The issue, as stipulated by the parties, was:
Did plaintiff Dursie, at the time of the fire loss have an
insurable interest under the fire insurance policies issued
for the properties condemned by the plaintiff authority
which would entitle the plaintiffs to the proceeds of the said
fire policies? 5
Clearly the issue was insurable interest, yet the defendant contended: "The entire determination of the interest of the insured
must now be answered in light of the passage of title and the type
of title passing under the laws of eminent domain in Pennsylvania." The defendant further argued that the filing of the security bond was the equivalent of cash,7 and under the Second
Class County Code vested title in the county as if compensation
had been paid to the condemnee.8 The defendant concluded that
without title, the plaintiff had no insurable interest.9
The plaintiffs argued "that the crux of this case is the 'insurable interest' that the condemnee has before he gets paid for the
taking of his property, not the 'title' that he retains."10 With respect to defendant's contention that the bond passed title and insurable interest to the authority, plaintiffs agreed that the bond is
appropriate and necessary to secure possession before the condemnee is paid for his land. They maintained, however, that no
eminent domain statute equated filing the bond to actually paying
the condemnee for his land.I'
Dursie was argued twice before the Allegheny County Court
of Common Pleas, first on defendant's preliminary objections to
the complaint and, after the objections were overruled, a second
time on the merits. 12 The court regarded the issue as simply fitting the facts of the case to the eminent domain statutes to determine when title passed. Finding that title to the condemned
property had not passed prior to the fire, the court concluded that
the plaintiff retained an insurable interest. The court said:
We cannot hold otherwise than that title passed in the
within case when compensation was paid. Such being the
case, we find that plaintiff Dursie had an insurable interest
at the time of the fire loss and that plaintiffs are entitled
to the proceeds in question. 13
Before discussing the basis of the lower court's opinion, its
holding should be compared with the reasoning of the Pennsyl5.
6.
7.
399 Pa.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

207 Pa. Super. 240, 242, 218 A.2d 87, 88 (1966).
Brief for Appellant, p. 2.
Brief for Appellant, p. 14, citing Peoples Natural Gas Co. Appeal,
226, 160 A.2d 391 (1960).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 5627 (1953).
Brief for Appellant, p. 13.
Brief for Appellee, p. 7.
Brief for Appellee, pp. 1-2.
113 P.L.J. 630 (1965).
Id. at 531-32.
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vania Superior Court in favor of affirmance:
There is a lot of confusion in these cases as to when is the
time of taking and when title vests under the various condemnation statutes. In the instant case if title had passed
from the owner at the time of filing of the bond, he had
lost his property not only before he had been paid but before the amount of his damages had been determined by
the -machineryof the statute. There is value uncertainty
that comes from proof of loss in a suit on a policy before a
jury and value uncertainty that comes from the fair market
value before and after a taking that must be determined by
the viewers on the jury and these value uncertainties may
constitute the "reasonable expectation of legitimate profit
14
or advantage"' under the definition of insurable interest."5
The "value uncertainties" referred to are property rights which
remain in the condemnee even though his title has passed to the
condemnor under the applicable statutes. Most obvious is the right
to be paid for property taken, which includes the opportunity to
appeal to the courts for adequate compensation. Trial before a
jury, whether for murder or property damages, involves uncertainty-a risk of loss. If, for example, a condemned building was
destroyed by fire before condemnation damages were assessed, the
condemnee would be forced to prove to a jury the value of a building that no longer exists for their inspection. He may or may not
prove the actual value of the property, but without the building
for viewers or a jury to evaluate, he is faced with the clear risk of
receiving a smaller damage payment. The affirming opinion of the
superior court accords with many writers in the insurance field by
maintaining that this type of risk is insurable under the definition
of insurable interest: One has an insurable interest in property as
long as he can be benefited by its existence or detrimented by its
destruction.' 6
THEORIES OF INSURABLE INTEREST

Insurable interest is a basic requirement for purchasing property insurance. Unless the insured has an insurable interest in
the property he cannot insure it.17 This prerequisite is founded
upon the public policies of preventing wagering and reducing the
temptation to intentionally destroy insured property. 1 8
14. Citing 1 GOLDIN, LAW OF INSURANCE IN PENNSYLVANIA 93 (2d
ed. 1946).
(Emphasis
15. 207 Pa. Super. 240, 245, 218 A.2d 87, 89 (1966).
added.)
16. 3 COUCH, INSURANCE § 24:15 (2d ed. 1966); RICHARDS,
INSURANCE § 87 (5th ed. 1952); VANCE, INSURANCE 159 (3d ed. 1951).

LAW

OF

17. Harnett and Thornton, Insurable Interest in Property: A Socioeconomic Reevaluation of a Legal Concept, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 1162 (1949);
Salzman, The Law of Insurable Interest in Property Insurance, 522 INs.
L. J. 394 (July 1966).
18. 4 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 2121-2125 (1943);
Harnett and Thornton, supra note 17, at 1165.
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Approximately one-half of the states have statutes defining insurable interest. 19 Characteristic of one common type of statute
is the California Insurance Code, which requires the insured to
possess an expectancy of benefit or loss, coupled with a substantial,
existing, legally enforceable economic interest in the preservation
of the property to be insured.20 This type of insurable interest provision is an outgrowth of Lord Eldon's opinion in Lucena v. Crauford: 21 "That expectation thought founded on the highest probability, was not interest .... ,,22 Hence, a legally enforceable interest, as distinguished from an unenforceable expectancy, is required
before one can insure property. The difficulty with this theory is
that for 160 years the legally enforceable interest has usually
been,
23
and in many instances only been, the title to the property.
Five states have more liberal statutory requirements which do
not require a legally enforceable interest as a basis for insurable
interest. 24 These statutes are derived from Judge Lawrence's opinion in Lucena v. Crauford:25 "[I] t is applicable to protect men
against uncertain events which may in any wise be of disadvantage
to them. '26 This type of statute exemplifies the "factual expectation" theory as opposed to the previously mentioned "legal basis"
theory. Anyone who has an expectation of economic benefit from
the preservation of property or an expectation of loss from its destruction, regardless of his relation to the property, has an insurable interest in a "factual expectation" state. 27 In a "legal basis"
state, however, the expectation must be founded upon
a right to
28
the property which could be enforced in a court of law.

The distinction between the theories is illustrated by Farmer's
Mut. Ins. Co. v. New Holland Turnpike Co. 2 9 The Turnpike insured a bridge over which much of its traffic crossed. The bridge
was destroyed by fire, but the insurance company refused to uphold its policy because the Turnpike did not own the bridge and
had no other legal basis for an insurable interest. The court upheld the insurance company's contention although the Turnpike
19.

Salzman, supra note 17.

20. CAL. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 266-280 (Deering 1963). See also FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 627.01041 (1963); N.Y. INS. LAW § 148 (1940); N.D. CENT.

CODE ANN. §§ 26-03-04---26-02-10 (1960); S.D. CODE §§ 31.2202-31.2205 (1939);
VA. INS. CODE § 38.1-331 (1953).

21.
22.
23.

2 B. & P.N.R. 269, 127 Eng. Rep. 630 (1805).
Id. at 323, 127 Eng. Rep. at 650.
Harnett and Thornton, supra note 17, at 1172-73.

24. Asiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1105 (1956); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-2405
(1960); HAWAII REV. LAWS §§ 181-414-181-415 (1955); OKLA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 36, § 3605 (1958); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3373 (1961).
25. 2 B. & P.N.R. 269, 127 Eng. Rep. 630 (1805).
26. Id. at 301, 127 Eng. Rep. at 642.
27. Harnett and Thornton, supra note 17, at 1172-73.
28. Farmer's Mut. Ins. Co. v. New Holland Turnpike Co., 122 Pa.
37, 15 Ati. 563 (1888).
29. Ibid.
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suffered a loss of income from the destruction of the bridge. Since
there was no legal interest, there could be no insurable interest;
thus the court dismissed any factual expectation thinking. This
case represents the law in Pennsylvania and most other jurisdictions lacking specific insurable interest statutes, as well as the common interpretation in those jurisdictions which impose the "legal
basis" theory by statute.
The "factual expectation" theory is highly regarded by many
contemporary legal writers in the insurance field. Because of a
lack of cases defining and supporting it, however, its adoption is
not recommended and further discussion is beyond the scope of
this Note.
Collateral to the theory of insurable interest is the qquestion
of the extent of an insurer's liability when the insured does not
personally suffer pecuniary loss. This is especially relevant in Dursie because plaintiff Dursie was paid for her property by the plaintiff authority, a joined plaintiff and assignee of the insurance policy.
Dubin Paper Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America30 settled Pennsylvania law in this area. It based the insurer's liability on his contract of insurance and prohibited the insurer from pointing to the
insured's contract with a third person which may have relieved
the insured of any out-of-pocket loss. The Dubin court said:
For the premium paid by the insured, the insurer will, in
case the insured's building is destroyed by fire, indemnify
him to the extent that he can show that his wealth has
been depleted by the fire. In other words, the insurance
company gives the insured the equivalent in money of the
building lost by fire. The "loss" which the insurance comnpany contracted to pay to the owner of the building in the
event of its destruction by fire is the actual worth in money
of that building before it was destroyed.3 '
The loss contemplated by the contract of insurance is the destruction of the insured building, and it is the difference between
its value before and after the fire that the insurer must pay. 2
In Dursie, therefore, the insurance company was precluded from
relieving itself from liability on the contract by showing any payments to Dursie by the authority.
30. 361 Pa. 68, 63 A.2d 85 (1949).
31. Id. at 82, 63 A.2d at 92. (Emphasis added.); see also Rosenbloom v. Maryland Ins. Co., 258 App. Div. 14, 15 N.Y.S.2d 304 (1939);
Reed v. Lukens, 44 Pa. 200 (1863); Insurance Co. v. Updegraff, 21 Pa. 513
(1851). Accord, Eagles Square Mfg. Co. v. Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
125 Vt. 221, 212 A.2d 636 (1965); First Nat'l Bank of Highland Park v.
Boston Ins. Co., 17 Ill. App.2d 159, 149 N.E.2d 420 (1958); New England
Gas & Elec. Ass'n v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., 330 Mass. 640, 116 N.E.2d
671 (1953); Pink v. Smith, 281 Mich. 107, 274 N.W. 727 (1937); Foley v.
Manufacturers & Builders Fire Ins. Co., 152 N.Y. 131, 46 N.E. 318 (1897).
32. Dubin Paper Co. v. Insurance Co. of North, America, 361 Pa. 68,
82, 63 A.2d 85, 92 (1949).
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Pennsylvania law contrasts with the minority "indemnity
theory," or "Wisconsin Rule." The states adhering to that rule
reason that a fire insurance contract is a contract of indemnity,
and when no pecuniary loss has been sustained by the insured, he
3
is not entitled to recover the proceeds of his policy.
The insured
34
must suffer an actual out-of-pocket loss to recover.
To illustrate the two theories, suppose A is the owner of a fire
insurance policy on his own home. The home burns down and A's
father, seeing that A has no shelter, gives him another house of
comparable value or rebuilds the destroyed house as a gift to his
son. A has suffered no out of pocket loss, but he has paid premiums for insurance to protect him against the very peril which occurred. The father has made a gift to A-not to the insurance
company. The courts adhering to the Dubin rule would allow recovery for the damage to the property, maintaining that the insurer can not set up any contract or gratuity in a third person to
avoid liability on its contract. States following the "Wisconsin
Rule" would deny liability because the insured suffered no out-ofpocket loss.
APPLYING INSURABLE INTEREST THEORY TO EMINENT DOMAIN STATUTES

In Pennsylvania, Leona Dursie could recover on her fire policies
even though she had been fully compensated by the authority. Noting that this right to recover is based on her ownership of the insurance policy rather than title to the property, an examination
of Heidisch v. Globe & Republic Ins. Co.3 5 will reveal the incongru33. Paramount Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 163 Tex. 250,
353 S.W.2d 841 (1962); Citizens Ins. Co. v. Foxbuilt, 226 F.2d 641 (8th
Cir. 1955).
34. Excellent comparisons of the two theories can be found in Alexandra Restaurant v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 858, 79 N.E.2d 268
(1948), in which the court held that a lessee had an insurable interest and
a right to receive the insurance proceeds even though his landlord completely restored the damage done by the fire; and in Ramsdell v. Insurance
Co. of North America, 197 Wis. 136, 221 N.W. 654 (1924), in which the
court held that a lessor had no insurable interest and could not recover the
proceeds due under his fire insurance policy because his lessee, pursuant
to the lease agreement, made the necessary restorations after the fire.
It should be noted in the New York case that the lessee has no title to
the property, but he does have an insurable interest based upon his legally
enforceable lease contract. Further, the lessee would not profit by the
fire, since he would be required, in a court of equity, to turn over to the
landlord an amount indemnifying him for the expense of repair. Under the
"New York Rule," the insurance company is made to honor its contract and
pay the insured for the loss in value to the building. If a third party has
actually suffered the loss, he will be able to get indemnification in a court
of equity. This issue did not arise in Dursie because plaintiff had as-

signed her policies to the condemnor.
35.

368 Pa. 602, 84 A.2d 566 (1951).

This is the leading case dealing

with insurable interest in eminent domain proceedings.
A.L.R.2d 888 (1953).

See Annot., 29
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ous manner in which Pennsylvania's basic insurable interest policies are applied to its eminent domain statutes.
The facts of the Heidisch case were similar to those in Dursie.
The plaintiff owned a fire insurance policy on his building, his
property was condemned, and at some time before he was paid by
the condemning authority the building was destroyed by fire. The
only difference was that no bond was filed in Heidisch. In light
of the applicable eminent domain statutes, however, this distinguishing fact is of little consequence.3 6 The issue in Heidisch was
also similar:
Does the owner of property which has been condemned by
eminent domain but title to which has not yet passed to
the county have an insurable interest in the property entitling him to compensation under 3a 7 contract of insurance
upon the loss of the building by fire?
The major difference between the two cases is that in Heidisch
the parties agreed that the plaintiff held the title; the defendant
contended, however, that it was only a paper title and represented
no interest in the property.3 8 In Dursie the title was directly in
issue, and its retention by the plaintiff accounted for her insurable
interest.
In Heidisch defendant advocated that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court disregard the Durbin precedent requiring insurance
policies to be upheld on contract principles and adopt the "indemnity" or "out of pocket loss" approach. 39 The court refused to
stray from Dubin, but its reasoning on the effect of plaintiff's
title established the basis for the defendant's argument in Dursie.
The Heidisch court noted:
[I] t is analogous to the situation where the insured enters
into an agreement to sell the premises and after the signing
of the agreement but prior to the passage of title a fire occurs. There, as here, the insured holds title as security for
the purchase price. In that situation we have repeatedly
40
held that the vendor possesses an insurable interest.
The court's analogy to sales agreements is sound since it concludes that the condemnee's title has value because it furnishes security for payment from the authority. This reasoning, however,
in effect precludes any other interests from having value after the
"security title" has passed. If the condemnee (vendor) has been
paid for his land, then he has no security title and hence no in36. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 537 (1929). This statute, used in Heidisch,
provided for title to pass when the consent verdict is paid to the condemnee.
37. 368 Pa. 602, 603, 84 A.2d 566 (1951).
38. Id. at 604, 84 A.2d at 566-67.
39. Ibid.
40. 368 Pa. 602, 605, 84 A.2d 566, 567 (1951), citing Dubin Paper Co.
v. Insurance Co. of North America, 361 Pa. 68, 63 A.2d 85 (1949); Reed v.
Lukens, 44 Pa. 200 (1863); Insurance Co. v. Updegraff, 21 Pa. 513 (1851).
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surable interest. In Dursie the superior court opinion in favor of
reversal followed this reasoning and equated the filing of the bond
to payment for the land. They concluded that since the condemnee
had been paid, she had no title and therefore no insurable inter4
est. '
The disturbing effect of limiting insurable interest to condemnees who retain title in the condemned land becomes apparent
in the following hypothetical situation. Given the facts of Heidisch or Dursie in 1967, the case will be determined under the 1964
Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code. 42 Under these statutes, title
passes to the condemnor on the day it files its declaration of taking. 4 The condemnee no longer retains title on the condemned
land after condemnation. Under the theory propounded in Heidisch and followed by the common pleas court and superior court
in favor of reversal in the Dursie case, when title passes, the insurable interest is extinguished. Although the condemnee loses
title by virtue of the Code, and not because he no longer has a security interest, he is deprived of insurance coverage on property
for which he has not yet been compensated.
Prior to the Code the condemnee did not lose his title or insurable interest until he was paid, thereby removing any risk of
loss. The Code completely secures the condemnee's right to compensation by requiring that an open end bond be filed upon issurance of the condemnation petition. There is practically no
chance that the condemnee will not be paid, but there is also no assurance of the amount of damages the condemnee will receive. The
condemnor will make an offer it believes reasonable, but this does
not mean that the condemnee must accept the offer. He retains
the right to prove the damages he feels should be paid for the taking of his property, regardless of where the Code places title.
This right to prove damages is precisely the "value uncertainty"
referred to in the affirming opinion of the Dursie superior court.
If the building burns down before viewers or a jury can assess
damages, the condemnee suffers the obvious loss which results from
the attempt to prove the value of a nonexistent building.
In Heidisch nearly three and one-half years elapsed between
condemnation of the land and payment to the condemnee. In Dursie, the period was two and one-half years. The opportunity for
injustice in this area is patent. It is unthinkable that a landowner
would retain no interest in the condemned land for up to three and
one-half years while the price to be paid for it is still undetermined.
During this period, however, the condemnee is denied the right
to insure his investment and secure the right to collect damages
equivalent to the value of his property. If the buildings are de41.
42.
43.

207 Pa. Super. 240, 247-48, 218 A.2d 87, 90 (1966).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-402 (Supp. 1965).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-402 (Supp. 1965).
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stroyed, his chance of proving their value is greatly diminished;
There is no reason why one who has no title should bear this risk
of loss without the right to insure the property for its actual value.
If insurable interest was found and the condemnee allowed to
insure the condemned property, he could upon its destruction collect the full value of the property from the insurance company.
This is in accordance with both Pennsylvania views on insurable
interest: (1) there is a legal basis for the insurance in the owner's
right to just compensation; and (2) the insurance payment is based
on the property value loss. The extension of this reasoning is that if
the condemnee had been paid for the property, as in DuTsie, the
condemnor would have an action44against the condemnee for reimbursement of the damages it paid.
The Dursie opinion in favor of affirmance emphasized that an
insurable interest remained in the condemnee even if title had
passed. "If, in fact, legal title had passed he still had certain property rights to support an insurable interest, call it what you will, a
qualified title that is insurable, or an interest in property. '45 The
court enumerated the insurable property rights the condemnee retains regardless of who holds title:
After the taking: (a) the owner had the right to compensation; (b) he had the right to petition for appointment of
viewers to determine compensation; (c) he had the right
to appeal from the decision of the viewers, if dissatisfied
with the award; (d) he had the right to appeal from a decision of a jury as to the amount of compensation ...
All these rights of the plaintiff-owner are involved in
46
the condemned real estate regardless of when title passed.
The superior court opinion in favor of reversal accepted the
defendant's argument that the filing of the bond was the equivalent of compensation and passed title to the condemnor. 47 Following
this opinion concluded that
the familiar and tangible "title test,"
48
plaintiff had no insurable interest.
Although the lower court opinion was affirmed by a split superior court, the opinion recommending reversal was in accord with
the lower court's reasoning on the effect of passage of title. The
sole distinction was the effect of the bond. The lower court held
that the bond did not pass title, therefore plaintiff retained an insurable interest; the superior court in favor of reversal maintained
that the bond did pass title, hence the plaintiff retained no insurable interest.
44. 368 Pa. 602, 605-06, 84 A.2d 566, 567-68 (1951).
45. 207 Pa. Super. 240, 245, 218 A.2d 87, 89 (1966).
46. Id. at 245, 246, 218 A.2d at 89.
47. Brief for Appellant, pp. 4, 5, 15, Dursie v. American Union Ins.
Co., citing Peoples Natural Gas Co. Appeal, 399 Pa. 226, 160 A.2d 391
(1960); Goodman v. City of Bethlehem, 323 Pa. 58, 185 Atl. 719 (193f.'
Lutz v. Allegheny County, 302 Pa. 488, 153 Atl. 903 (1929).
48. 207 Pa. Super. 240, 248, 218 A.2d 87, 90 (1966).
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The superior court in favor of reversal based their opinion
on
49
the dissenting opinion in Peoples Natural Gas Co. Appeal:
The majority completely misconceives the function of the
bond. It not only fixes the rights of the parties as written,
but it legally converts the property into cash and works the
actual passage of title.A0
The instant the bond is approved it becomes the equivalent
of cash, the owner's right to compensation becomes vested
and absolute according to the bond, and title to the land
condemned actually passes to the condemnor. ....
"
Though the language is unequivocal, it remains that of a dissenting opinion. Moreover, Lakewood Memorial Gardens Appeal,5 2
cited by appellee Dursie, appears to negate the ability of a bond to
pass title:
The giving of a bond, as required by Article 16, Section 8 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution, to secure for just compensation to an owner for property "taken, injured, or destroyed"
in an exercise of eminent domain, is, of course, a prerequisite of the condemnor's right of entry. In constitutional
contemplation, it is the entry which constitutes the "taking,
injury, or destruction" before which compensation for the
affected property must be paid or secured. 3
Lakewood explains that the filing of a bond secures the constitutional requirement of just compensation before a condemnor may
enter a condemnee's land. The Dursie common pleas court accepted the Lakewood interpretation and, finding no eminent do54
main statute which provided for the filing of a bond to pass title,5
interest.
insurable
and
title
retained
concluded that the plaintiff
[W] e feel that the statutes are clear. We cannot hold otherwise than that title passed in the within case when compensation was paid. Such being the case, we find that
plaintiff Dursie had an insurable interest at the time of the
fire loss and that plaintiffs are entitled to the proceeds in
question. 56
49. 399 Pa. 226, 160 A.2d 391 (1960).
50. Id. at 238, 160 A.2d at 397.
51. Id. at 237, 160 A.2d at 396.
52. 381 Pa. 46, 112 A.2d 135 (1960).
53. Id. at 55-56, 112 A.2d at 140.
54. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 5627 (1953). The Second Class County
Code, applied by the Dursie court, provides in its heading for "Title to vest
upon payment of award." The appellant has petitioned for an allowance to
appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the basis of this statute.
The body of the act does not refer to the passing of title and the heading
contains the reference due to an editorial error which was corrected by the
Act of 1963, June 6, P.L. 98, § 1. For the purpose of this Note, however,
the error is unimportant since the opinion referred to several other statutes,
including the Act of 1929, May 2, P.L. 1278, § 537 used by the Heidisch
court, which clearly state that title passes when the award is paid.
55. 113 P.L.J. 530, 531 (1965).
56. Ibid.
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Although the common pleas decision is the law of the case, the
reasoning of the superior court in favor of affirmance appears more
sound because of its emphasis on placing title in a subordinate position to other property rights. An examination of the 1964 Eminent Domain Code reveals that subordinating title in the search
for insurable interest is necessary for fair treatment of condemnees.
The 1964 Eminent Domain Code causes title to pass to the condemnor on the date the condemnation certificate is filed. "7 As
noted in the comments to section 1-402 of the Code, this provision
was derived from the federal declaration of taking procedure. 8
In United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Prince George's
County,5 9 the effect of the federal statute was determined:
THE 1964

EMINENT DOMAIN CODE

Under statutes permitting the Federal Government to
acquire title to property immediately after filing of a petition in condemnation by depositing money estimated to be
just compensation for the land taken in court, the estimate
of just compensation determined by the taking authority
and deposited in court is not conclusive on the property
owners as to the full measure of just compensation which,
when the estimate is deemed inadequate, is to be determined by a jury after a full hearing, and a judgment for
greater valuation, if any, than the sum deposited is to be
entered in favor of the persons entitled.6 0
Under the federal statute title passes immediately upon condemnation, but the condemnee retains the right to full compensation for property. The 1964 Eminent Domain Code goes even further in providing for the condemnee to retain interests in the
property until all of his ties to the land are legally severed. This
policy is keynoted in the Joint State Government Committee's Comment following section 1-402:
This section changes existing law and represents a distinct trend away from the former concept of condemnation
in Pennsylvania, which has always been concerned with the
property interest of the person rather than the property.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-402 (Supp. 1965):
Condemnation, under the power of condemnation given by law
to a condemnor, which shall not be enlarged or diminished hereby,
shall be effected only by filing in court of a declaration of taking,
with such security as may be required under section 1-403, and
thereupon the title which the condemnor acquires in the property
condemned shall pass to the condemnor on the date of such filing,
and the condemnor shall be entitled to possession as provided in
section 1-407.
58. 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1931):
Upon the filing of said declaration of taking and of deposit in
the court, to the use of persons entitled thereto, of the amount of
the estimated compensation stated in said declaration, title to the
said lands ... shall vest in the United States of America .....
59. 40 F. Supp. 436 (D. Md. 1941).
60. Id. at 437.
57.
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In other words, condemnation under this provision is now
a proceeding in rem.61
The effect of changing condemnation from a proceeding in personam to a proceeding in rem can be explained by cases under Ohio
law, in which condemnation proceedings have been in rem:
A land appropriation proceeding is essentially one in
rem; it is not the taking of the rights of persons in the 62ordinary sense but an appropriation of physical property.
It is a proceeding in rem because it relates solely to the
question of ascertaining or assessing the fair market value
of the property, in order to make compensation to the
owner, which is done solely in order to enable the public
to get title and possession of the property for public use. 63
When proceeding in rem, the condemnor is interested in acquiring physical possession of the property for immediate use. Filing the bond and passing title are merely mechanical requirements
of the consitution to achieve this purpose and do not affect the
rights of the condemnee. Apparently the Pennsylvania Legislature intended in the 1964 Eminent Domain Code to vest title in the
condemnor as quickly as possible so that it could use the property
according to its plans. While providing for immediate title passage, however, the legislature reserved to the condemnee other legal
rights relating to the property. These rights are substantial and
could be substituted for the old "title test" as a basis for insurance
interest.
Section 1-403 secures the condemnee's right to just compensation:
Except as hereinafter provided, every condemnor shall
give security to effect the condemnation by filing with the
declaration of taking its bond, without surety, to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for the use of the owner or
owners of the property interests condemned, the condition
of which shall be that the condemnor
shall pay such dam64
ages as shall be determined by law.

This provision is, in effect, an enactment of the Lakewood holding concerning the purpose of a security bond.6 5 Although it may
seem-that if an open end bond is filed to secure any damages the
condemnee might prove his insurable interest is eliminated, the
problem remains of proving the value of property destroyed before
a judgment is reached.
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-402 (Supp. 1965).
62. City of Euclid v. Lakeshore Co., 102 Ohio App. 96, 104, 113 N.E.
2d 372,-377 (1956).
63. Martin v. City of Columbus, 101 Ohio St. 1, 4, 127 N.E. 411, 414
(1920).
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-403 (Supp. 1965). See also the comment following § 1-402: a condemnor with taxing power need not file
any bond, since taxing power is sufficient security.
, :65. 381 Pa. 46, 55-56, 112 A.2d 135, 140 (1955). See text accompanying
notes 63 and 64 supra.
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The condemnee may also challenge the bond, the propriety of
the condemnation itself, or any other procedure of the condemnor by
filing preliminary objectionsr " I The Code gives the condemnee a
maxiumum of sixty days to object to the reason or manner in which
his land was taken. This period is comprised of the first thirty days
after the filing of the declaration, within which the condemnor
must give notice of the condemnation;' 7 and the following thirty
days within which the condemnee must file any preliminary objection.6" The period may be extended by the presiding judge upon a
showing of good cause. 9
If the court finds the condemnee's objections to be valid, under
section 1-406 it may revest his title.70 For at least sixty days after
the condemnee has lost title, he has a statutory possibility of getting the land back. He has been paid nothing and lost title, yet
he has a statutory right to have title revested if he should prove an
impropriety in the condemnation. Although it has not been determined who bears the risk of loss during this period, it would
seem that with the possibility of being revested clearly available,
the condemnee would be detrimented by destruction of the property. The possibility of its return gives the condemnee an interest
in its continued existence.
Since the condemnee has legally lost title, the legislature has
apparently given him this right to be revested as compensation for
the immediate divesting. The condemnee's interest is substantially
the same whether (a) his land is condemned without title passage
followed by two months of negotiations after which he is either
paid and loses his right to the property7 l or retains it because of an
error in the condemnation; or (b) the Code situation in which the
condemnee loses title immediately upon condemnation only to have
it revested within sixty days, or has his objections dismissed followed by payment and loss of his rights in the property.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-406 (Supp. 1965):
a) Within thirty days after being served with notice. of condemnation, the condemnee may file preliminary objections to the
declaration of taking. The 'court upon cause shown may extend
the time for preliminary objections. Preliminary objections shall
be limited to and shall be the exclusive method of challenging (1)
thd power-or right of the condemnor to appropriate the condemned
property unless the same has been previously adjudicated; (2) the
sufficiency of the security; (3) any other procedure followed by
the condemnor; or (4) the declaration of taking. Failure to raise
these matters by preliminary objection shall constitute waiver
thereof..
b) The court shall determine promptly all preliminary objections and make such preliminary and final orders and decrees as
justice shall require, including the revesting of title.
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-105 (Supp. 1965).
68. P:-A. STAT." AN. tit. 26, § 1-406 (Supp. 1965).
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-406 (Supp. '1965).
.
70. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-406 (Supp. 1965).
'71. This was the sitimtion in:Dursie under the 1953 Second Class
County Code.

66.
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Section 1-406 should be considered a substitute for title because it gives the courts the same tangible, legal basis upon which
to base insurable interest, while giving the condemnee a clear possibility of regaining his land.
Even after the sixty day period for preliminary objections there
is still the possibility that title may be revested in the condemnee.
The condemnor has the privilege to relinquish the property if (a)
he has not taken physical possession of or paid for the property
and (b) he files a declaration of relinquishment within one year of
the taking.7 2 Upon relinquishment of the land by the condemnor,
section 1-408 provides for "title to be revested in the condemnee as
of the date of the filing of the declaration of taking .... ,,73If the

condemnor has neither taken possession nor paid for the property,
the condemnee retains a clear possibility of being revested for one
year and the rationale for extending insurable interest beyond the
date of condemnation is strengthened. If the property was destroyed within this period, the landowner could collect an amount
equal to the value of the property before the fire from the insurance company.74 There would be no need for a lawsuit to determine the damages the condemnor would be required to pay. The
purpose of granting the condemnee an insurable interest, then, is
to secure his right to be paid the true value of his property. This
right is in jeopardy if the property is destroyed prior to a determination of damages by the judicial process.
It should be noted that section 1-410 provides that if the condemnor abandons the purpose for which the property was condemned within three years after the date of condemnation and the
property has not been substantially improved, it must be offered
first to the condemnee at the same price he received before it may
be otherwise disposed of.7 5

Although this provision prevents the

condemnor from abandoning the original condemnation project and
selling the land at a great profit, 76 it does not appear to be the substantial basis upon which an insurable interest can be founded.
Under the abandonment provision the condemnee must buy
back the land and he must pay the price he was originally paid
even though the land may have depreciated as well as appreciated.
Under the preliminary objections and relinquishment provisions,
however, the land reverts back to the condemnee without any affirmance of payment from him thus importing a greater element of
certainty and a clear interest in the property. This distinction will
have to be made by the courts when a case presents the problem.
72.
73.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,

§
§

1-408 (Supp. 1965).
1-408 (Supp. 1965).

74. See 113 P.L.J. 530, 532 (1965); 368 Pa. 602, 605-06, 84 A.2d 566,
567-68 (1951).
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,

76.
(1959).

§

1-410

(Supp.

1965).

See Starkey v. City of Philadelphia, 397 Pa. 512, 156 A.2d 101
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The possibility is present, nevertheless, especially in areas where
the land is appreciating, that the condemnee's insurable interest for
a period of three years from the date of condemnation could be extended.
CONCLUSION

The probability of inequities arising from application of the
Heidisch and Dursie holdings to the 1964 Eminent Domain Code
is high. 77 Because of the title passing provisions of the Code, the
"title test" has become an unreliable indicator of insurable interest
in property. The logical alternative appears to be the rights given
the condemnee by the Code in exchange for his title. In sections
1-406 and 1-408 the condemnee has a clear legal right, upon the occurrence of certain conditions, to reacquire his property. At the
same time the courts have a substantial legal basis on which to find
an economic interest in the property. Insurance is necessary here
as it is in any business transaction where an owner gives up his
property with the possibility of regaining it. He wants to be assured that the property returned is equivalent to the property given
up. This assurance can only be acquired through insurance.
It is therefore submitted that insurable interest in eminent domain proceedings should be extended to condemnees for the period
during which the condemnor has a right to relinquish the property.
GERALD K. MORRISON

77. See Dursie superior court opinion in favor of affirmance, 207 Pa.
Super. 240, 246-47, 218 A.2d 87, 90 (1966).

